Category Archives: M&E

Asking the right questions about Ushaidi

The White African faces a quandary:

Global tools that have real time read/write access are extremely powerful. Depending on ones motives, your impact can be good or bad. Even if your motives are good, your tool can be used for bad. How’s that for a quandry?

It’s certainly a quandary, but not a new one. It’s the same question that’s been asked about humanitarian aid since at least the 1970s, and has been one of the motors behind the humanitarian reform process. What’s more interesting is the assumption behind that question, an assumption that he describes quite clearly:

Just decades ago those who were not in close enough proximity to an event were unable to do much, if anything about it. Today, we can successfully effect change through digital tools and be thousands of miles away.

As I wrote in the comments, neither of these statements is quite true. Decades ago you could have joined Amnesty International campaign, or given money to a relief agency, or written to your MP; these options are still available, and will make a difference. The problem we have today is that many people feel that such actions don’t make enough of a difference – that they don’t have a big enough impact, or they don’t bring change quickly enough.

We have to start being honest, though; just because the internet works reliably and at high speeds, it doesn’t mean that humans work at similarly high speeds or with similar reliability. The impact of our actions will almost never be immediate, and will frequently lead to outcomes that we didn’t predict. Our expectations have been raised by the relentless cheerleading for the information revolution, and we need to lower those expectations or risk alienating people who want to get involved.

The real questions are the same ones that I ask myself in my own work whenever I approach a new project. What decision or action will this information inform, and who is responsible for making that decision or taking that action? The answers to those questions determine a) whether it’s worth collecting the information in the first place, and b) what we will do with the information once we’ve collected it. Unless we answer those questions clearly, and build our systems around them, we’re unlikely to effect any significant change, no matter how powerful our tools are.

(For a bit more on Ushaidi, Sanjana has a great interview with Ory Okollah, in which she explains clearly that the site has been used as an information-gathering tool, rather than a resource for conflict mitigation or resolution. Just to be clear, I think Ushaidi is absolutely worthwhile – but I’m looking forward to what comes next.)

Stamping on Statistics

The government are very keen on amassing statistics. They collect them, add them, raise them to the nth power, take the cube root and prepare wonderful diagrams. But you must never forget that every one of these figures comes in the first instance from the village watchman, who just puts down what he damn pleases.

Josiah Charles Stamp was many things during his lifetime, including President of the Royal Statistical Society between 1930-32, and his view on government statistics is well worth bearing in mind whenever we look at the sort of statistics that tend to crop up in humanitarian and development work. International organisations tend to act in much the same way as governments when it comes to statistics, which we usually refer to as indicators.

Until very recently, all the information we had during a disaster was based on eyes on the ground – from residents in or visitors to affected areas. With the advent of remote sensing, we have a new source of information that doesn’t rely on actual presence – but even so, it’s worth noting that remote sensing without some form of ground truthing is frankly useless. I remember when we were looking at crop patterns in Afghanistan – an expert could pick out opium crops from a satellite image, but it was still necessary to send people to verify (and get shot at, of course – all part of the fun). So we still rely on eyes on the ground, which means that there’s always a human factor involved in data collection.

Where there’s a human factor, there’s always the scope for creativity that Stamp noted, or for deliberate manipulation. On the micro scale, that’s unlikely to make a huge difference, since when you aggregate up to a national level many of the irregularities will be levelled out – unless everybody at the micro level is fiddling the numbers in the same way. For example, anybody affected by a disaster is likely to exaggerate their needs if they think it will mean more assistance; any organisation responding to a disaster is likely to accept those exaggerations if it means they are likely to get more funding. As always, it’s good advice to follow the money.

So what does this mean for the poor information manager, tasked by his bosses to tell them what’s going on? Well, Stamp wasn’t saying that statistics were useless, only that we need to remember where they come from, which is rule number one: scrutinise your sources. He wasn’t saying that the village headman is out to cheat you, only that the village headman is human, so rule number two is: minimise the ways in which errors can be introduced to your data collection. As I noted above, those errors tend to get levelled out when you aggregate up – or at least to get less obvious amongst the mass of data – so rule number three is: where possible, always cross check your data against other sources.

Rule number four, of course, is: don’t expect statistics to solve all your problems. We tend to get a little fixated with a fetish for figures in this field (and I’m as guilty of that as anybody – look at the pretty pictures!) but, if our analysis or presentation aren’t solid, those figures aren’t going to be much use to managers.

Proxy Indicators, or Making It Up As We Go Along

There’s inevitably a data drought when you’re working in an emergency in a developing country – either the coverage isn’t good, the historical record is patchy or the accuracy is questionable. In many cases, the data simply isn’t there – nobody has collected it in the past or is collecting it at present. Where they are collecting it, the collection process often isn’t systematic and the results are in formats that aren’t easily shared – where people are willing to share their data, which they often aren’t.

In my last blog post, you might have noticed that we were trying to identify water scarce unions. There’s no actual data on water scarcity, though – it’s not the sort of thing that anybody has ever measured in itself. So how do we work out which locations are potentially water scarce?

What we did was use a proxy – a set of data that we do know that can stand in for what we want to know. In this case, we had a list of unions where tube wells aren’t feasible – derived from a couple of phone calls and some photocopied sheets. Tube wells are the primary means through which the government delivers water to communities, due to the nature of the ground and the groundwater (particularly when you’re close to the sea, salinity is too much of a problem).

Where tube wells aren’t possible, we assumed (and it was an assumption) that there would be chronic problems with water supply – problems that would have been exacerbated by Cyclone Sidr. These are the locations where the humanitarian community needs to make sure that alternatives are available – for example, water trucking to ensure a supply line, even if it isn’t sustainable – and to allocate resources for rehabilitation, particularly rehabilitating the ponds that local communities rely on where they don’t have tube wells.

Now I freely admit that there aren’t many people who are as fixated on data quality and quantity as me – most people are busy actually implementing programmes rather than crunching numbers. Yet it’s something we should be concerned about, because if we don’t accurately know the numbers and locations of people in need, then how can we possibly target assistance properly? If we don’t have good baseline data, then how can we know if our work has had any impact (especially where high poverty levels make it difficult to work out which problems are specifically caused by a disaster and how many were pre-existing)?

Ugandan Displaced join Somali Refugees in Google Earth

Maybe they could form a support group? I know, I know, that’s not the sort of thing we’re supposed to joke about.

Yan Rebois of CartONG has written to let me know that their displaced mapping project with UNHCR is now public, an interesting application based on Google Maps, for general use by humanitarian organisations. Although it requires a log-in to edit anything, you can view the information without any authorisation.

The application maps the locations and background information on the displaced communities that UNHCR and partner agencies are working with in Uganda, centred around Gulu, which makes sense. It’s specifically listed as “operation informationâ€

Measuring Progress (humanitarian NGO version)

Fellow itinerant keyboard-basher Michael Howden sent me a link to the specification that he developed for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) database that he’s developed for Save the Children in Aceh. He’s become something of a one-man database development shop recently, working in Aceh and Pakistan and soon in Uganda.

In the accompanying post, he mentions that the critical difference between development work and emergency relief is that the former operates on a much longer timeframe than the latter. In my experience, development projects aren’t necessarily any longer-term in their thinking than emergency projects, but that’s not my main point.

Michael is talking specifically about the problem of incorporating qualitative information into M&E processes, particularly if you’re building a database to deal with those processes. Qualitative info – narrative text, pictorial records, and so on – is notoriously difficult to deal with.

I tend towards the maxim “if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it”, so I often question the value of much qualitative information for the purposes of project management. It is extremely useful, however, for a number of other things – fundraising or advocacy work, for example.

This argument often gets me into bar fights with disgruntled development workers, who feel that the qualitative information is in fact the more important stuff. In particular there’s a feeling that factors such as capacity or attitude can’t be measured by numbers alone, which may be true; but they can be measured (opinion polls being the obvious example), and that makes them amenable to a quantitative approach.

Information just wants to be free!

It’s embarrassing, but in my youth I could often be heard telling people “Information just wants to be free!” I can’t even remember what I meant now. I was probably crazed with power at the time. But I was on a phone conference with Microsoft earlier today, and at one point somebody started to talk about how we would have to discuss how to deal with proprietary data collected during a humanitarian response. Suddenly, the years rolled back and information just wanted to be free again…

One of the problems that I’ve faced repeatedly is that UN or NGOs in the field just aren’t very good at sharing their information, either with their peers or with the beneficiaries. Most often, the objection is raised that, if we share information (particularly from assessments), our “competitors” might take that information, use it to develop a project proposal, and take all the cash from our donors’ pockets.

Please. Donors don’t give us money because our assessments are amazing, or because our project proposals are dazzling. Trust me, I’ve seen a lot of assessments and proposals in my time, and generally they’re crap (especially in a sudden-onset emergency, when everybody’s losing their marbles). The donors give us money because we already have a contract with them, or we know them from that bar in Kabul, or because we happened to drive past their office and they desperately need to spend a $500,000 budget by lunchtime.

If we’re talking about a public entity (a non-governmental organisation) using public funds (either from a government or from the general public) to carry out public service (providing relief to communities) in a foreign country where the government has a clear stake in responding to and recovering from a disaster?

All the data collected by that NGO should be made freely available as quickly as possible, with the only possible exceptions made for privacy or security issues.

Discuss.