The bulk of On the Brink is a detailed narrative overview of the violence that occured in Kenya between December 2007 and March 2008. Whilst there is some discussion about the antecedents of the political crisis, the most solid stuff is in the analysis of the recent violence. Here, the authors slice the same source material different ways to give nuanced assessments of the violence through the lens of Kenyan criminal law, international criminal law, and Kenya’s commitments under international human rights law.

KNCHR find ample evidence of crimes against humanity, but note that they din’t find enough information to sustain the argument that these were in furtherance of any state or organizational policy. They also found that whilst much of the violence was motivated by ethnicity, genocide was not committed since “the intent was not to destroy but to create means by which to leverage political power following the disputed presidential election results.” The report’s standout recommendation for action is likely to be highly unwelcome, particularly now everyone’s friends again:

The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) should open investigations on Kenya to determine who bears the greatest responsibility in the commission of crimes against humanity detailed in this report.

This is the fourth major outing for “conflict mapping”, the investigation methodology behind this report. In 2004, I co-wrote a similar report for Sierra Leone using the same method. Investigators take lengthy statements from a key persons in all areas affected by violence throughout the country. From the statements, data analysts draw out references to unique “episodes”, simple information about which is then put into a database.  Episodes can include a wide range of topics, from a source’s recollection of specific acts of violence, to information about gangs, troop movements,  public statements of local politicians, and other sit-rep style information. It also includes hearsay, or information about things that the source was not a direct witness to. From the 1102 statements collected by KNHCR in the early part of this year, 7500 distinct episodes were separated out and databased. From these, it’s possible for analysts to build a “low resolution” picture of a mass event, and identify its scale, severity, major incidents and overall dynamics.

This wide not deep approach is designed to look for evidence of policies, planning and systematisation, all critical to the judgement about whether patterns of violence can be framed as crimes against humanity. As Kenya is a State Party to the International Criminal Court, this is something Kenyan policy makers and activists must consider anyhow, but other information available to help them with this is likely too narrowly focussed, raw or detailed, to be useful to this particular decision. In this respect, conflict mapping is fit-for-purpose; at this early stage, attempting to individually investigate every incident, of which there will be tens of thousands, is not.

The immediate deployment of investigators across across a wide geographical area is a good demonstration of capacity which might help a national human rights instituation fend off attempts to marginalise it.  It also creates an immediate context to the severity and significance of criminal incidents, something that it is hard to assess as events are unfolding. The popularly known atrocities aren’t necessarily either the most sure-fire winners for prosecutors, or the worst things that have happened. This, and the mapping exercise’s rapid generation of leads, can help prosecutors later by giving them a guide to where to invest investigative resource.

The report certainly won’t stand up in court, but it’s not designed to, and it wouldn’t be possible to produce a document of that sort in anything like a useful timescale. This is designed to provide timely analysis as part of the complex decision making process of bringing to account those most responsible for the violence.  Framed this way, On the Brink may have lost a lot of impact due the long period of drafting. I hope the recent appearance on Wikileaks of an embargoed confidential annex to the report (.pdf, 59 pages, ~2.5mb) containing the names of 250 alleged leaders, planners, faciliators and perpetrators of the violence makes up for this.

Related posts:

1. Human Rights Advocacy IS Information Management
2. Information Management for human rights
3. Graphologists for Human Rights

As tensions and violence began to spill into the streets in Kenya in late 2007, the government decided to ban local live broadcast. Whilst this is obviously controversial, there were fears that radio, in particular, could be used, as it had done in Rwanda, to incite violence. The ban of live reporting meant that SMS began to be utilised as an update method and thus ‘mobile reporters’ were born.

The Government realised that they couldn’t control the internet or the text messages which were being sent to incite hostility, so they countered them with their own blanket text messages stating that the violence was illegal and that Kenyans should be concentrating on peace.

The role of radio broadcasts in supporting the genocide in Rwanda is well-documented (see the Nahimana and Barayagwiza cases at ICTR) and is a valuable cautionary tale. However few people have stopped to think much about how SMS could be an even more powerful tool for those inclined to mass violence. Radio broadcasts can incite the mob, but they are a weak tool for co-ordinating the mob; SMS, on the other hand, has the capability to be much more dangerous in the wrong hands. But when I say “the wrong hands”, what do I mean?

The Kenyan government were acting benevolently in attempting to curtail the bloodshed but others could use it for their own means… It demonstrates how the same information can be used for very different ends and poses questions about safeguards: can and should they be put in place to ensure that ICT tools are used for empowering and not repressive purposes?

The Kenyan government may have been acting benevolently – although it’s worth pointing out that it was in their interests to prevent violence simply because they hold the monopoly of violence. In most countries in the world, if not all, governments are not naturally inclined to empower their citizens. Communications technology should be available as widely as possible, and I don’t want anybody – least of all the government – legislating about who should have access to it on the basis of their ideology.

I think it’s dangerous to talk about “safeguards” to ensure that ICT tools are used for empowering and not repressive purposes; there’s no such thing as the wrong hands. The short version: technology can be used for good or ill, and preventing people using it for ill can only be achieved if you also prevent people using it for good. I’m happy to be challenged on this one – are there cases where I might be wrong?

Related posts:

1. Quickbits January 2008
2. Asking the right questions about Ushaidi
3. Violence 2.0: some lessons from Ushahidi

Global tools that have real time read/write access are extremely powerful. Depending on ones motives, your impact can be good or bad. Even if your motives are good, your tool can be used for bad. How’s that for a quandry?

It’s certainly a quandary, but not a new one. It’s the same question that’s been asked about humanitarian aid since at least the 1970s, and has been one of the motors behind the humanitarian reform process. What’s more interesting is the assumption behind that question, an assumption that he describes quite clearly:

Just decades ago those who were not in close enough proximity to an event were unable to do much, if anything about it. Today, we can successfully effect change through digital tools and be thousands of miles away.

As I wrote in the comments, neither of these statements is quite true. Decades ago you could have joined Amnesty International campaign, or given money to a relief agency, or written to your MP; these options are still available, and will make a difference. The problem we have today is that many people feel that such actions don’t make enough of a difference – that they don’t have a big enough impact, or they don’t bring change quickly enough.

We have to start being honest, though; just because the internet works reliably and at high speeds, it doesn’t mean that humans work at similarly high speeds or with similar reliability. The impact of our actions will almost never be immediate, and will frequently lead to outcomes that we didn’t predict. Our expectations have been raised by the relentless cheerleading for the information revolution, and we need to lower those expectations or risk alienating people who want to get involved.

The real questions are the same ones that I ask myself in my own work whenever I approach a new project. What decision or action will this information inform, and who is responsible for making that decision or taking that action? The answers to those questions determine a) whether it’s worth collecting the information in the first place, and b) what we will do with the information once we’ve collected it. Unless we answer those questions clearly, and build our systems around them, we’re unlikely to effect any significant change, no matter how powerful our tools are.

(For a bit more on Ushaidi, Sanjana has a great interview with Ory Okollah, in which she explains clearly that the site has been used as an information-gathering tool, rather than a resource for conflict mitigation or resolution. Just to be clear, I think Ushaidi is absolutely worthwhile – but I’m looking forward to what comes next.)

Related posts:

1. Quickbits January 2008
2. Ugandan Displaced join Somali Refugees in Google Earth
3. ECB4 Report Launch: Information and Technology Requirements

What’s cool?

• It’s timely: the number of people who actually get these kind of things off the ground, as opposed to jibber-jabber about them, is very small. Getting preliminary, lead information as close as possible to the time the incident happened is extremely valuable in every possible scenario and not just the “document now, prosecute later” one.
• It challenges the conventional view by providing an opportunity for people to read first hand accounts un-editorialised by the MSM, who seem intent on warping the events into the template of Generic Violence in Africa.
• It’s quite easy to use: the system focussed on getting raw information in the form of sit-rep narratives online without overburdening the person submitting the information.
• It links in with current monitoring processes: although I’ve noticed a few irrelevant submissions up there, it seems they’re making an effort to ask NGOS on the ground to verify the basic thrust of an incident. I am sure that the information from Ushahidi will find its way into other, formal efforts to document what is going on.

What could be cooler?

• Clarify the purpose of the system: Paul raised this in his earlier post – what exactly is this system for? Some of the published material is very general situation narrative unrelated to specific incidence of violence. Some of the incidents are also based on news reports from the international media, but this is a system that aspires to give the raw groundview and not information that’s been twice around the world first.
• Get just a little more structured information from people submitting reports: With all that narrative, I wouldn’t like to be the analyst for the raw info Ushahidi holds at this point. Whilst the whole “Who Did What To Whom” model for documenting violent acts might frighten the general public from actually using the online submission system, separating out the recording of information about the nature of the incident (deaths, theft, destruction of property) from the perpetrators and victims would be a step enabling a useful dimension of analysis. It’s not exactly clear what “names of the involved” really means. They could usefully take a browse through the HURIDOCS Events Standard Formats and Microthesauri for some inspiration.
• More transparent verification could increase its credibility: A clearer indication of how incidents are verified, and who is doing the verification, preferably with some kind of attribution. At present, a cross or a tick next to the incident isn’t going to satisfy anyone that the incident wasn’t fabricated.
• Build follow up into the system: you want people to continue using the site as an information resource. What will prompt them to return is features will give them updates: perhaps a daily email or sms digest. Not sure quite how this could work, but there you go.

Where’s everyone else at with this?

Related posts:

1. Violence in Kenya, as seen by Web2.0
2. Lessons learned from global ICT responses
3. ISCRAM 2006

What does this tell us? The virtual world isn’t resistant to real-world pressures, and it doesn’t necessarily overcome social divisions – hence the problems with the bulletin board. These pressures can be managed, but it’s no easy thing – but would Ushaidi be any less resistant to hijacking by people intent on promoting social divisions? I guess not – but people are using Ushaidi far less than bulletin boards, so it’s less of a target.

I was hoping to draw some lessons from this, but I can’t remember what they were. I like Ushaidi, though, and I think the call for a global version of Ushaidi is well worth pursuing – but raises lots of issues around what you’d actually do with it. Is it for advocacy? Security? Monitoring? I guess that these are my usual questions, since I had exactly the same feeling about BrightEarth when it started, and I’m still no further along the path of working out what my answers are.

Related posts:

1. Disaster Risk Reduction and Social Bookmarking
2. Quickbits January 2008
3. What do aid workers and spies have in common?

• There’s been a fair amount of discussion about how the media and responders can work more effectively together in the last couple of years, and of course a whole heap of blogs and similar about how the new technology is going to change the face of disaster response, etc, etc.  So far, not much has happened, but TVE Asia and the UNDP Regional Centre in Bangkok have just published a free resource called Communicating Disasters.  It’s an interesting but disjointed read – I’m not exactly sure who it’s targeted at, to be honest…

• There was a brief flurry of blogging around Nathan Eagle’s article, The Mobile Web is NOT helping the Developing World – and what we can do about it, mainly because it burst the bubble of optimism around bringing the internet to the poorest through the Miracle of Mobile Telephony (TM).  Of course, Nathan’s position is not that it isn’t possible, just that we’re not doing it right at the moment.  Personally, I’m still waiting for some hard evidence that these efforts benefit the poor rather than the relatively well-off – but that might just be splitting hairs.

• Witness have launched The Hub, their online platform for human rights-related videos and media, after a long incubation period. Cutting through the bumf, it’s intended to connect individuals and organizations who are working on human rights around the world. It’s an interesting lunge at building global connectivity in a sector (human rights) that is notoriously factional, and the focus on media is potentially powerful – particularly new media forms, such as mobile phone content, which are incredibly powerful tools for mobilizing support. You can register at http://hub.witness.org/login.

Related posts:

1. Quickbits December 2007
2. Mobile Response 2008: Call for Papers
3. Human Rights Advocacy IS Information Management