The first thing to note is that it has the interesting title “Where is the Money?”, explicitly tying the future of aid to the financing of aid. We can all agree that funding – both the amount and the sources – are vital to humanitarian aid, but it worries me that discussions about the future of aid might be reduced to a discussion about finance rather than principles.

The second thing to note is that the poll shows that the aid community is as unimaginative as the rest of the population. There’s no shame in that, but it does show that we need a bit more grit in the vaseline. If we’re responding to disasters, we need to actually predict disasters, not just predict business-as-usual with a few extra people living in cities. A word from Noah Raford:

In the end, futures work is rarely about accurate prediction. It is almost always about staging a useful intervention which encourages discussion of the most challenging aspects of the present… The best futures projects take on difficult subjects of today, cast them forward, then reflect them back upon the present in order to make them discussable, now.

The problem with the Alertnet poll is that it does take on difficult subjects of today but it fails to cast them forward. What do I mean by this? The poll notes that one factor increasing humanitarian need will be high and volatile food prices, which is true; but it’s been true for the last four years. Another factor noted is increased urbanisation, which is also true: but 50% of the global population became urbanised in 2008, so that’s also been true for at least the four years¹.

The same is basically true for every single item on this laundry list of future problems. They’re all problems that we should have been planning for ten years ago, have only recently noticed that they’re a big deal, and are now assuming that those are the problems that we’ll face in the future. In military terms, this is what’s referred to as “fighting the last war”, and it’s generally agreed to be the quickest way to lose the next war.

Exhibit A: the factor deemed likely to increase humanitarian need was an increase in climate-related disasters. The reason for this selection is that climate change is now the dominant meme in environmental circles – which isn’t to say it isn’t important, but it might not be important in the way you think.² Exhibit B: The biggest challenge to the delivery of humanitarian aid was thought to be the politicisation of aid. The reason for this selection is the war on terror – but the politicisation of aid is baked into the aid industry, and calling it a “challenge” completely misses that.

I could go on, but hopefully you get the point. The reason why this Alertnet poll is wrong is not that the responses are “wrong” – they accurate reflect what people believe to be true – the problem is that what they believe to be true is wrong, in the sense that it doesn’t actually reflect the future of aid. Visit the site, read the results and watch the video anyway: it’s still interesting, even if it’s wrong.

And now, a vision of the future we definitely won’t get:

Click here to view the embedded video.

1. In fact urbanisation has been a critical issue for much longer, but completely overlooked due to the rural bias of traditional livelihoods interventions.
2. There are a whole host of environmental problems that are not necessarily climate-related (eutrophication, topsoil degradation, deforestation, you choose) or that are climate-related but don’t come at us from the obvious direction of “more flooding!” Boy, am I looking forward to the first famine due to ocean acidification.

Related posts:

1. Welcome to the future
2. Heuristics for this discussion
3. Ushahidi: crowdsourcing in their own words

In a couple of previous posts, I outlined why I think open data poses serious difficulties for the humanitarian sector. A lot of those difficulties stem from endemic weaknesses in the humanitarian sector, because at root I believe that failure has been built into the humanitarian system, and I really need to get around to explaining what I mean by that. That can wait for next time, because right here I want to lay out what I think needs to happen if humanitarian organisations are ever going to survive the changes that the information age has brought, as it relates to using data effectively.

Two things to bear in mind. First, that this is taking the perspective of organisations as they are now; but I also think that organisations will evolve into new forms in the course of this century, a greater variety of forms than the traditional “corporate” model allows (and yes, most NGOs are set up on a corporate model). Second, that all of these steps are not merely realistic, they’re actually relatively easy, and especially relatively easy compared to the path that most organisations are currently taking. The reason that they’re not being widely pursued is that they emerge from a view of the humanitarian system as just that – a system, with multiple interacting layers – rather than as a hierarchy reaching from global headquarters down into “the field”.

Training

1. Create freely available training modules and support material via e.g. Moodle, so our staff can start doing it for themselves. Then open up that training material so that anybody can benefit from it – local government, local NGOs, affected communities, national universities, anybody.
2. Create an accreditation system for info management trainers, initially based on prior experience. Don’t accredit people in “information management”, they can do a university course if they want a diploma; but accredit trainers so that you can reach into the professional training community.
3. Run facilitated online and onsite courses, provided by accredited trainers and leading to accreditation for participants. Okay, I lied – it’s okay to accredit people in information management. The reason that I hesitate about this is because accreditation only really works if there’s an infrastructure around it that recognises and value accreditation.
4. Integrate accredited info management course into existing accredited programmes (e.g. RedR, Clusters, etc). This step deals with that infrastructure issue, but only to a certain extent. There’s a lack of recognition of “management” a professional skill in the sector, which is always going to work against us.

Data sharing

1. Establish data standards, mainly to stop the UN agencies from dicking around with their data and refusing to agree on e.g. basic demographic categories. Data standards are not complicated but they are difficult, especially when people don’t get the basic point. It’s a minimum set, not an exhaustive set; it’s for practical implementation, not policy roll-out.
2. Adopt common data sets and agreements on e.g. which population figures we’re going to use. OCHA has done the groundwork on Common Operational Datasets (pdf), but I don’t know what the latest state of play is. What I do know is that by this point there should be an online interactive map with those datasets easily searchable behind it AND THERE ISN’T. ; the next step is working out how to leverage those datasets more effectively in the field to create better decision-making tools. (Thanks to Ben in the comments for correcting my ignorance, and my apologies for shouting at OCHA when I really should have checked my own bookmarks folder – and well done to all involved.)
   
3. Begin capacity building from the field-level up in managing data and using information more effectively. I can’t stress this enough – all capacity building should start as far out on the “edge” of the organisation and work inwards, not the other way around.
4. Lobby from the HQ-level down on integrating actual information into decision-making. This is where HQs have the requirement – not for info management skills, but for decision-making skills based on good info. Don’t bother sending managers on info management courses, they’re never going to be crunching spreadsheets; they need to be able to read spreadsheets and connect that with their actual work.

Advocacy

• Operational level – lobby to solve location-specific data issues using time-limited task forces, as a way to raise awareness that IM is essential for decision-making.
• Country office level – lobby to create better environments for information management within organisations and meetings, focused on staff not technology.
• Head office level – lobby to integrate data into decision-making, and for HQs to make reasonable and informed calls about what information they’re requesting from the field.
• Global level – promote of data standards, CODs and capacity building strategies, and stop having high-level meetings that pretend to be designing tools for the field.

Most people think setting principles out and getting agreements down is important. I don’t. I would drop having principles in favour of signing up agencies to a ‘pathway’ of simple practical steps which incorporate the principles at an implicit level. Introducing principles makes it possible for everybody to nod their heads at the next meeting and then do absolutely nothing to follow up. And finally, that Shorty Long track at the top has literally no relevance to the blog post, except to the extent that I believe that I AM DE JUDGE.

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1. Disaster Response Capacity in Guatemala
2. How to build capacity in humanitarian NGOs
3. Avian Influenza Capacity Map

“I have talked to teams of students designing new de-mining tools without ever having visited a mine field, students designing tools to make charcoal without understanding how poor people improve their incomes by selling the charcoal briquettes they make, and teams of students so convinced that they will create the next revolutionary product and make a fortune doing it that they forget to talk to the customers they are designing for. If these patterns of design arrogance and lack of respect and curiosity about customers and markets become institutionalized in the hundreds of new courses now springing to teach design for the poor, their impacts will be just as trivial as design for the rich.”

- Paul Polak, The Life and Death of Big Institutions

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2. Ever have one of those years? And Darfur, mapped.
3. New Year High Resolution….

Having said that, open data in government 2.0 [Wow, has that term dated quickly.] does not necessarily mean the same as open data in the humanitarian sector; importing of principles and approaches wholesale from one sector to the other is almost never effective. In more practical terms, if governments are already signing up to release their data in general, that already covers data that might be deemed humanitarian specifically. There is almost no data which can be labelled solely ‘humanitarian’ [most of it relates to population movements] and there’s an increasing amount of ‘development’ data online. Since we’re already seeing a big push in the open data movement globally, I’m content to let that play out rather than try to shoehorn it into the humanitarian sector.

While we are seeing is movement in open data on the development side, that seems to have translated into more transparency regarding development finance, rather than a push to turn everybody into Hans Rosling. Rosling’s work is fantastic, and has done a lot to raise the visibility of development issues, it’s not intended to provide serious tools for decision-making at the national or regional level; the data simply isn’t detailed enough. That’s changing, and will continue to change, as the Age of Big Data bears down on us; but Big Data doesn’t resolve policy issues, and technocrats are often misguided in their expectations.

So what do I think open data can achieve? Simply put: more effective assistance to disaster-affected communities. What sort of data do we need to achieve that? Equally simply: operationally relevant data. I don’t care about data being shared as much as I care about data being collected; you can’t open up data that you don’t have, so our first priority should be getting decent data in the first place. The problem at the supply end is the lack of systematic data collection, which needs to be addressed with better survey work; and data should be collected solely in order to facilitate better decision-making – there’s no other reason to collect it. If that data isn’t being used for decision-making, then sharing it is irrelevant, which means that advocacy for and training in using data for decision-making is a higher priority than making data open right now.

The next consideration is that there’s always a cost to sharing data: although that cost has become substantially lower (great job, internet!), it still exists. Do the benefits of sharing data outweigh the cost? Please don’t argue that the costs are neglible, because they’re not – it’s a massive investment in an organisational change process just to get on the first rung of data sharing, there are lots of technical costs, and the potential for disaster is high (as the UK National Health System can tell you). I think the benefits outweigh the costs, but we need to build a stronger case than currently exists, which means we need to do a better job of drawing the dots between data and impact.

And this is where it gets tricky. Government 2.0 is all about transparency and accountability, and Development 2.0 is an extension of that, with an additional component of aid effectiveness. I would argue that this effectiveness component is much, much more important in Disaster 2.0 (ha!), but there’s also a tension around the role of government that a lot of people are in danger of missing. Hopefully everybody can agree that the big push for better data needs to be at country level – but humanitarian organisations frequently have a more adversarial relationship to government than UN agencies. We can’t expect MSF to participate in open data sharing with the Government of Sudan.

This isn’t just a question of context, this is a question of ensuring that humanitarian principles are preserved in any data sharing agreement: for example, if neutrality is in tension with transparency, which principle wins out? That’s a question that the current discussion around open data has simply not addressed, but it may turn out to be the most important question of all.

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2. Disaster Prediction, Social Networking Boosted by Geo-Data Feeds
3. Back on the data wagon

I realise that lolcatz are yesterday's news.

The second round of Humanitarian Innovation Fund grants have now been decided, and should be posted on the HIF large grants website before too long. Once again, the Grants Panel discussions about innovation were as interesting as the projects themselves – possibly more so this time, because I had a feeling that the level of innovation in the proposals submitted for this round was even weaker than the last round.

That evening I had a chance to catch up with Ben Ramalingam, whose work on complexity and aid is some of the most interesting research being done in the sector at the moment. We had a wide-ranging and fascinating discussion that took in landscape engineering, urban mathematics, humanitarian futurology and the relative merits of the Sandman and Lucifer comic books (I’m down with Lucifer, Ben with Sandman – but he’s going to give Lucifer another chance).

I don’t agree with Ben on everything, but his views are always interesting, and this started me thinking. Where are the interesting thinkers in the humanitarian sector? There’s a lot of thoughtful people working on aid issues (some of whom blog), but being thoughtful isn’t always enough to qualify as an interesting thinker. The blogs I linked to are consistently insightful, but they’re tightly focused on aid, without much effort to introduce tie together new ideas in an innovative way.

While I was in London for the HIF, I also had the chance to drop in on the Truth and Beauty sessions curated by Vinay Gupta. Up front, I disagree with Vinay on a lot of issues – but he has the ability to pull together widely divergent thoughts into something coherent and his views are never less than interesting. Vinay is in a different (if tangentially related) space to the humanitarian sector, and I actually struggle to think of many individuals in the humanitarian sector who have the same capacity.

Since then I’ve chatted with a few friends and colleagues, and asked them the question: who are the interesting thinkers in the humanitarian sector? So far I haven’t been able to build a list, and that worries me. The humanitarian community is struggling at the moment with a range of issues which we’re ill-equipped to deal with, and the default solution to tough challenges is to add more layers to the bureaucracy. There’s a serious lack of vision within the sector, and nobody’s close to addressing that gap.

Related posts:

1. Response to Chris Blow 3: Please Prove Me Wrong
2. Stating the obvious about technology
3. How to avoid humanitarian rickrolling

I know how you feel mate, I know how you feel.

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Haiti has exposed both the benefits and risks of the web-enabled response to disaster. The positive side has been written about extensively – wider awareness, greater levels of engagement, access to potentially valuable resources (whether satellite imagery or volunteer time). I’ll go on record here as believing that these are all to the good, and possibly the starting point for greater good in the future; although if we’re going to get to that future good, everybody’s going to have to check their egos at the door.

Unfortunately the negative side is almost completely ignored. Wider awareness that isn’t informed by grounded understanding is useless, and occasionally dangerous; greater levels of engagement need to harnessed in the right direction if they’re going to have any impact; and access to resources is unevenly distributed and comes loaded with assumptions that are often hidden from the people who provide those resources. The UN Dispatch blog post series is a good start but it’s no substitute for hard discussion.

Haiti also amplified another trend – the involvement of the public in debates about humanitarian principles and practice. This is something that we should welcome, but I’m a big fan of people knowing the limitations of their own experiences. I don’t feel the need to pontificate on the finer points of hospital management, because I’m not competent to discuss them; yet for some reason people feel that they’re entitled to pass judgement on the humanitarian sector based on what they just read in Wired or Newsweek.

While the recommendations in the Disaster 2.0 itself are likely to have positive impacts, they’re generally about how the humanitarian community can better utilize technology, rather than how “volunteer and technology communities” (and my word, what a frightful phrase that is) can perform better. Likewise this report on Volunteer Technology Communities does nothing more than describe what they do, rather than the impact they can have.

If we put all of this together, we can identify the problem at the heart of this debate; and possibly why some on the “V&TC” side has become increasingly defensive. In all the discussion about how social media might affect the humanitarian community, as far as I know, nobody has yet articulated a clear theory of change. That was what I was hoping for last year, when I challenged the crowdsourcing community to clearly articulate how the inputs they deliver will lead to the outputs they claim will result.

If we’re going to work actively to ensure that our use of technology is going to help anybody in post-disaster/post-conflict responses (whether 2.0 or just plain 1.0), all of us need to be much clearer about exactly how it’s going to help. I emphasise that this is a management problem, not a technology problem; and to their credit the Disaster 2.0 report writers very clearly targeted their recommendations on addressing the management issues, at least in some small part. Let’s see where this takes us.

Related posts:

1. Technology on Disaster’s Frontlines
2. Post-disaster communications in Pakistan
3. NetHope Disaster Relief White Paper

So, where were you working before this?

The first stage in this process is simple: where you’ve worked sends a clear signal as to how hardcore you are. If you reply “I spent two years in Ghana with the Peace Corps”, nobody will take you seriously. If you’re able to casually respond “Oh, I was in DRC last month; had a 2-month stint in Afghanistan before that; and was covering for some colleagues in Somalia until we had to be evacuated”, then you’re safe. The important factors here are: location, duration and role. If you arrived in Haiti a year after the earthquake, you are nowhere near as hardcore as somebody who arrived four days after the quake and stayed for 2 weeks.

Once initial credibility is established, this enables your interrogator to follow up: who were you working with? Again, be careful. If you say “Homeopaths without Borders”, nobody will speak to you again. This is a minefield, and I’m never quite sure how to negotiate it. If I say that I worked on a PRT in Afghanistan, it’s +3 hardcore points but -2 “humanitarian principles” points. Sometimes I think it would be easier if everybody had a D&D-style character sheet that they could just hand out when they arrive. It would be more useful than a CV. Almost everybody brings their own prejudices to the table, so you’ll have to get through this one on your own.

The final phase is, “Oh, you must know [insert name of friend X].” If you can establish a mutual friend in the sector that both of you trust, the network effect takes hold and a certain amount of trust is automatic. A mutual friend is a handy shortcut that enables you to avoid the tedious business of actually finding out whether somebody is any good at their job and should be taken seriously. However, if you name somebody who your interlocutor thinks is an incompetent buffoon, you’re going to have to do a lot of work to gain their trust – and their cooperation, if you should need it.

That first question is doing a lot of work in the aid industry. I don’t like it, but I do it myself. I sometimes catch myself worrying whether my own answers are sufficiently credible (especially after taking a reasonably long break from work), and thinking that the whole thing is ridiculous. The problem is, I can’t come up with a better alternative…

Related posts:

1. What do aid workers and spies have in common?
2. 36 years of police archives in Guatemala opened up
3. Lessons learned from global ICT responses

Some argue that celebrities don’t know much about the issues they pontificate on. but that clearly isn’t true. Everybody agrees that Bono knows his beans, and this article on Clooney makes clear that (with a little help from John Prendergast) he’s reasonably well-informed. It’s also true that there isn’t an exam you have to pass before you’re allowed to care about something.

Some argue that sending celebrities into disaster zones, while it draws the cameras, doesn’t really raise awareness of the issues or raise funding by the barrel. This is a stronger line of attack, but still not that strong. Considering how much it costs, and how widespread the practice is, it seems likely that the return on investment is reasonably good, as far as it can be measured.

The furthest that most people are prepared to go is to worry that the presence of Clooney – or any celebrity – distracts from the issue rather than drawing attention to it. But everybody knows that you’re not sending Shakira to Bangladesh because it makes Bangladeshi kids happy – they haven’t got a clue who she is. Shakira’s in Dhaka because you get UNICEF footage on the 6 o’clock news.¹

What makes us uncomfortable is that when you put a celebrity into the middle of (for instance) South Sudan, it throws our own culture into sharp relief. Sending a celebrity to draw attention to an issue makes us realise that a culture that needs celebrity in that way has gone wrong somewhere. We can’t articulate the real problem because we’ve been trained not to notice it, although locals do.

We think that sending in a celebrity will draw attention to the issues we care about because we’ve been trained that this is the nature of celebrity – a bright light shining in a dull world. Yet the presence of somebody deemed more important than others for nothing more than their visibility spits in the face of our humanitarian principles, which tell us that everybody is equally important.

Celebrities gain their status at the expense of any decent conception of what humans are worth. Most of the time we don’t notice it because nearly everybody in our societies is infected, and because many of us want the coin of celebrity ourselves. We imagine that earning that coin will improve our lives, but that’s a narcissistic fantasy that will later be used to sell us things.

It’s not the fault of celebrities themselves, since they’re oblivious to the nature of their status. I don’t have anything against George Clooney – I think he’s a fine actor, and I enjoy his movies – or any other celebrity. They can choose to spend their celebrity however they want, and I applaud anybody who decides to spend it drawing attention to issues that I also believe are important.

Spending that coin costs the celebrity nothing, however; in fact it buys them more celebrity at the expense of the cause that they’re promoting. Our vain hope is that the celebrity will rub off on the cause, but spending the coin of celebrity makes all of us a little poorer. Celebrity deforms the entire humanitarian enterprise; we should want no part of it.

1. I am perfectly happy to single UNICEF out here.

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3. Rambling Man

For me, the value of the 4636 system was never been just about the actionability of the data — I saw the reports were profoundly flawed as soon as they began to arrive. There were amazing sparks of actionability — glimpses of something we can all fumble toward somehow — but it was always clear that these were no replacement for well-tested logistics plan.

I know that you and others working in the crowdsourcing ecosystem in Haiti must have recognised this. Yet it didn’t seem like the public statements at the time reflected this; it doesn’t seem as if any of the interviews or conference presentations or media articles reflected this; and most importantly of all, it didn’t seem as if your message to the people of Haiti reflected this. It’s interesting that the rhetoric now – after the funding is in place, after the conference invitations are in, after the media attention has been secured – is much more circumspect than it was previously.

And what exactly was the value of the 4636 system from your perspective? This is what I’ve been really interested to hear.

But, while I was quite aware of how utterly limited the data were, this never made me question the basic value of an open communications system during this crisis.

I guess this is where my old-school sensibilities are a handicap, because my view is that if you’ve set up an information system and the data it’s producing is not that useful, there’s a problem with that system. If we agree for a moment that there’s nothing wrong with your technology, that means there’s a problem with the inputs – because as we all know, the basic rule is garbage in, garbage out – yet the inputs are exactly what you’re claiming are special about your system.

When I am in a crisis, I want strong systems in place that let me text anything I want.

The problem here is that your needs are not necessarily a useful guide to the needs of other people. I’ll say that again, because it’s a fallacy that affects nearly everybody starting out in relief or development: your needs are not necessarily a useful guide to the needs of other people. It’s nothing personal: my needs aren’t a useful guide to the needs of other people either. Hell, my needs probably aren’t a useful guide to your needs, or vice versa.

However I agree that open communications (along several tracks) are valuable, and that accessible communications systems can be as important as accessible food distribution networks. Different criteria apply in a disaster, though; the food distribution networks run by Wal-Mart aren’t as effective in South Sudan. This doesn’t mean that we can’t learn something from Wal-Mart – just that we need to be careful about what we learn.

The same holds for technology; context is vital and we can’t just transplant things that work really well in one place to another. And besides, there’s already a strong system in place that lets you text anything you want – it’s called the mobile phone network.

There may be a limited amount of resources on a particular day in a particular crisis — but in the long term I believe that there are millions of people who could be engaged in productive and powerful work through diverse and open platforms.

I also believe that there are millions of people who could be engaged, it’s just that I don’t believe that millions will be engaged. There’s already ways in which those people could be involved if they wanted to, and the vast majority of them simply don’t want to. I long ago ceased to be naïve enough to believe that everybody shared my value set, so I’m not condemning anybody here; I just fail to see why anybody thinks that technology will magically make people more altruistic.¹

The only vaguely convincing argument I’ve seen says that the internet – and in this case crowdsourcing – has lowered the barrier to entry to get involved in humanitarian activities. Unfortunately that doesn’t mean that more people will get involved, because the barrier to entry was also lowered on a huge range of other, more interesting activities that people will choose instead of the difficult and depressing work of humanitarian activities. A lower entry barrier is also a lower exit barrier, as Ushahidi found out somewhere between Haiti and Pakistan.

The bitter truth is that you may have to face the possibility that the crowdsourced response to Haiti was possible mainly because Haiti is within flying distance of the US, has a long history with the US (including a large diaspora community), and was a particularly media-friendly disaster. I’m not saying that this was definitely the reason why that particular crowdsourced response ever got off the ground, but I’m interested to hear what this discussion looks like from the other side, rather than just get fed another inane marketing video.

Particularly I see a great promise in networks which help people in crisis see their own neighborhood, to help each other, rather than always relying on the aid worker. So, information which seems predictable and “not novel enough” to an aid worker might be quite powerful to someone who lives down the street.

I agree completely. We are already seeing this (something I’m going to talk about soon in a follow-up article) but this isn’t the model of crowdsourcing that was developed in Haiti. I remain unconvinced that the Haiti model is a useful model for anything else – in fact I remain unconvinced that the Haiti model was a particularly useful model in Haiti. All I’ve been asking for is some evidence that it warrants the massive amount of hyperbole that surrounded it – and the opportunity costs of implementing it.

The other point to note here is that the fact that different types of information have different value to different people is trivially true. That being the case, then who gets the value in the type of information that Ushahidi et al gathered in Haiti – the aid worker or the person who lives down the street? Because it seems to me that the information gathered in Haiti might well be useful to somebody who lives down the street, but that’s not where the project was driving (because it was subject to exactly the same constraints as everybody else in reaching the street).

In this sense, I have a hard time understanding how you could question whether it has “any substantive value.” To me the value is self-evident, if complex, and problematic for traditional patterns of response.

The value may be self-evident to you, and others working on crowdsourcing projects like 4636 or Ushahidi, but they’re not self-evident to others. You can’t accept people to accept your claims just because you really, really believe; you need to present a convincing narrative. The narrative around Ushahidi is really convincing to technologists because it tells them that technologists can really really make a difference.

That narrative is a lot less convincing to people who actually do the work. All I wanted was for proponents of crowdsourcing to step up to the plate with something more than the usual vague gushing about the revolutionary power of the crowd, with some more awareness of the embedded technocratic ideology that comes with the package, and to be backed up by slightly more evidence than second-hand anecdotes from a US marine. I freely admit that I could be wrong – that was why I wrote the article – but I need to be shown to be wrong.

All tools are suitable for some tasks, and not for others. It strikes me as strange that Ushahidi is proposed as a mapping solution for citizen journalism; for election monitoring; for human rights monitoring; for emergency response; for clearing snow from American cities; and for pretty much any activity you care to mention. It strikes me as singularly unlikely that it’s a solution for all of them.

Generally speaking, the rule of tools is this: the wider the range of tasks that a tool can perform, the less effective it is for any given task within that range. There is no shame in anybody anywhere standing up and saying, “it turns out that our tool isn’t suitable for this particular taskâ€

1. I have to refer back to Shirky again. The opening chapter of Cognitive Surplus contrasts Ushahidi and Lolcats as two ways in which that surplus can be engaged; he judges one to be more constructive and one less constructive, but both are deemed more constructive than watching the television. This is bullshit. You learn more from watching Unreported World than you do from watching X Factor, but a lot more people watch the latter. Ushahidi maps to Uncovered Stories, Lolcats to X Factor, and you can do the math about how many people are likely to contribute to any given Ushahidi instance.

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2. Response to Chris Blow 1: Why We Fight
3. Disaster Response Capacity in Guatemala