humanitarian.info

I’m making my way through Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart‘s Fixing Failed States, something which I should probably have done a while ago.¹ The book, which is a fairly straightforward trot through some post-Washington consensus theorizing about the fate of failed states. It’s a valuable contribution to a debate which is unlikely to settle down any time soon, but – being who I am – I object to much of what I’m reading.

Even the starting point – the “failed state” – doesn’t seem to make any sense if there wasn’t a state there to begin with, but many of their set of solutions seem to be built on a number of assumptions that don’t make for very strong foundations. For the purposes of this blog – information management, remember – there’s a particularly telling example early on in the book, which is reproduced below the fold:

The presidential election of 2004 offered the Afghan population the first opportunity in their long history to elect their leader through a direct process. It also gave them a chance to leapfrog history and create a unified database of the country’s citizens based on reliable biometrics that would have enabled the state to function and increase citizens’ access to certification of their own identities.

Ah yes, biometrics. We all love biometrics, right? Well no, we don’t. The notion that a “unified database… based on reliable biometrics” would enable the state to function is more than a little bizarre, since many states seem to function quite well without. Indeed, looking at Afghanistan’s state dysfunction, it’s near-impossible to see in what way a unified database would enable it to function, and given the level of dysfunction the reverse² is true – it’s almost impossible to see how Afghanistan would enable a unified database to function.

Afghan authorities had detailed discussions with UN staff prior to the election and had urged them to use modern iris-based technology to enable the creation of a biometric database that would serve as the foundation for the country’s future planning and social policy. All of the Afghans we polled during this process viewed this identity device not as a threat to their civil liberties but as a vehicle through which to realize their identity as a citizen of the state, as well as a means to access a range of benefits and for taking part in an array of transactions…

Wow, those Afghan authorities were certainly ahead of their time! Bear in mind that in 2003 – when these “detailed discussions” were presumably taking place – even the Labour government in the UK (who love biometrics more than nearly anybody else) didn’t have the results of their first biometric enrolment trial, and were still quite wary about making claims like this. One wonders where the Afghan authorities³ were getting their information from, and whether we could see those documents.

And those Afghans “polled during the process” – so in tune with the times! Ghani and Lockhart are at pains to explain that those polled didn’t see the database as a threat to their civil liberties, so clearly they’re aware that there are a large number of people who do see such databases as such a threat. Even the most vigorous proponents of these schemes acknowledge that there are serious privacy issues involved, and most people in (for instance) the UK soon become concerned when you explain the details to them; so it seems strange that nobody polled in Afghanistan expressed any disquiet.

In the technological age, where investment in information provides a basis of further savings, the UN system refused our request and insisted on a manual process that was based on giving out cardboard cards and identifying recipients through inked fingerprints. Thousands of people registered to vote multiple times and acknowledged to the press that they had voted more than once. The same process was repeated during the parliamentary elections in 2005 at a cost of approximately $400 million… The alternative electronic system could have been put in place for $140 million and would have generated an estimated $80 million in its first year by issuing passports, drivers’ licenses, and identity cards. Identification of civil servants on a reliable basis was likely to eliminate the problem of “ghost workers” and therefore to reduce the civil service burden by a quarter and provide a basis for human resource planning. The system would also have provided a basis for an e-governance system, whereby citizens could track their interactions with the state. Simultaneously, the government would have been able to carry out user surveys on a wide range of interactions with citizens.

Yes, subsistence farmers in Helmand could have tracked their interaction with the state, something which I’m sure they’ve been waiting for. That interaction would have consisted of… nothing, and they would have tracked it using… I dunno, their iPhones? I jest. Of course they have some interaction with the state, however limited, and are likely to have more in the future, so there may be some value there. The problem with claims like these, though, is that they don’t seem to consider reality an obstacle – this system will simply be introduced and the benefits flow from it like nectar.

The UN’s excuse for not using the electronic system was that one of their donors had supplied $10 million worth of cardboard and would have been offended if it were not used.

That sounds… bizarre and unlikely. However my experience with the UN tells me that nothing is too bizarre and unlikely to be given as an excuse, so I can accept it.

Our ideas were considered too far fetched, as most of the UN officials we encountered lacked elementary schooling in the current trends in information technology. As the UN secretary general’s report of April 2006 revealed, the UN management system was completely out of date and needed significant overhaul.

It’s at this stage that descriptions of the Afghan government wander into the realm of fantasy. Just to clarify, these UN officials lacked elementary schooling in the current trends in information technology, while the Afghan authorities were so ahead of the curve that they were urging the creation of a universal database based on biometrics, something which still hasn’t been successfully implemented in any developed countries, let alone in a country where most ministries didn’t even have computers when I was there in 2002.

You can see where I’m going with this. Ghani’s professional background was in academia and with the World Bank – nothing wrong with that, but it does start to explain the technocratic undertone to this proposal (as well as his relative success as Finance Minister in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban). The technocrat firmly believes that with the right people (experts such as himself) in power and with the right technology (such as biometric databases) in place, problems such as these can be overcome.

The idea that the Afghan government – then or now – has the capacity to manage a system like this is delusional. There are a wide range of ailments in the body of the state, and while technology is an instrument to deal with at least some of these issues, a lot of other things need to be in place before the operation can begin. Perhaps somebody like Ashraf Ghani is qualified to work as an political surgeon in Afghanistan – but his operating theatre isn’t in good enough condition to carry out a complicated operation like a biometric database.⁴

Disappointingly, my blog post has again descended into sniping at people who – whether I agree with them or not – have at least thought about this, worked on this and remain committed to the project. You should read this book for the questions that it asks – perhaps especially with Haiti fresh in our minds, with the horrific opportunity it presents – but you shouldn’t necessarily accept the answers it provides. At least not without asking some of your own questions first.

1. Unfortunately I’m still traumatised from my last meeting with Ghani, which involved him storming into my office in the middle of a staff evaluation and haranguing me for 20 minutes about a dead tree. [↩]
2. The reverse reverse? I confuse myself. [↩]
3. Which in this instance I’m assuming translates roughly as “Ashraf Ghani”. [↩]
4. I should also note that I have an ideological opposition to this type of database, the reason for which I explain as simply as possible in this blog post. [↩]

There’s been frequent discussion here – and blogs like MobileActive, of course – about how cellphones can be used in humanitarian responses. It’s worth remembering, however, that technology is neutral – both “good guys” and “bad guys” use it (if you can be bothered with that way of looking at the world) – and that, in conflict situations, communications technology is seen as a legitimate target. So for all the talk of how empowering mobile technology is, we haven’t had much discussion about the other side of the coin.

This bring us neatly to an amazingly interesting post by Barnett Rubin on Informed Comment, entitled Taliban and Telecoms — Secret Negotiations Just Got Easier, and at a Price You Can Afford! Rubin is interested mainly in high-level policy issues – the post was sparked by a conference discussing political solutions in Afghanistan – but has some interesting stories about the role of mobile telecommunications in state-building. There are some interesting anecdotes about how reliant on cellphones people have become, as in the case of

a friend of mine who negotiated the release of two of his Afghan staff who had been taken hostage by Taliban in Wardak (just next to Kabul) said that it was always difficult to reach the kidnappers at night, because they moved away from the road up into the mountains where the reception was poor. Finally they had to explain to the Taliban that they needed to stay within the coverage range to reach a deal.

Coverage is not great but, according to the Afghanistan Telecom Regulatory Authority, mobile phone penetration is targeted at 10% for 2008, forecast to rise to 3% by 2013. That’s not bad, although a glance at the fixed line and internet penetration targets is quite depressing. In 2002 I had a couple of meetings with the Minister for Communications, Mohammed Masoom Stanekzai, and it doesn’t look as if the plans that we discussed back then have come very far.

Rubin publishes a letter from a Taliban military group to one of the mobile phone companies (apparently the Taliban prefer Areeba, because they have the cheapest top-up cards – good to see that they’re keeping an eye on their budget). As Rubin explains

I have been told that Taliban (or people claiming to represent them) sometimes call up mobile phone companies and claim that they are right at a tower with explosives, which they will detonate unless money is immediately transferred to their mobile phone. This is a new technology that enables migrant workers to send cash home without going through either a hawala or Western Union.

The hawala system has operated on mobile phones for quite a long time – in fact, hawaladars adopted mobile phones almost as soon as they were introduced – but it’s fascinating to see a technology which undermines the hawala grip making extortion so much easier. However it’s clear that the notewriters aren’t that worried about law enforcement catching up with them – because they provide a mobile phone number where they can be contacted.

Rubin’s concern is what the prevalence of these threats tell us about the level of Taliban control (or lack of it) across the country, and he also notes that this demonstrates that the Taliban are trying to work within the existing structures of the nascent Afghan state. However I find more interesting the way in which a new technology is being used in an entirely unexpected way. The Taliban are holding the cellphone network hostage – while at the same time requesting that their protection money be transferred through the same network.

Any lessons for the humanitarian or human rights community? Not really. We already know that cellphone networks are vulnerable in unstable environments, and we already know that technology gets used in unexpected ways by overlooked groups. However there is a significant positive in these developments. Rubin points out that in the 1990s satellite comms contributed to avoiding some conflicts (although they undoubtedly helped to co-ordinate many, many more). Cellphones are cheaper to use and easier to access, creating lines of communication did not exist before – or at least, were the monopoly of a powerful few.

Essentially, the increased penetration of cellphones creates more opportunity for dialogue and negotiation at more levels in Afghan society – even if that’s only whether they can get discount on top-up cards if they buy in bulk.