Author Archives: Paul Currion

De-Ossification Strategies

This article is cross-posted from The Broker magazine, who are hosting a discussion on the Future Calling blog. How can international development NGOs reshape themselves to contribute solutions to the thick problems of the future?

Ossification (noun): the natural process of bone formation: the hardening (as of muscular tissue) into a bony substance; a mass or particle of ossified tissue; a tendency toward or state of being molded into a rigid, conventional, sterile, or unimaginative condition.

Remko Berkhout has pointed out that there is an increasing amount of research that tries to envision the future for the NGO sector, to which I would add work by the Humanitarian Futures Programme and the Feinstein Center. Publications such as these, providing a useful focus on the rapidly changing external environment, are necessary but not sufficient for the changes that need to take place if the underlying spirit of the NGO community is to survive.

Paul Polak has described institutions as “radical ideas cast in concrete”, and INGOs are no exception. The concept of the INGO is around 60 years old, more than enough time for their initially lean muscles to harden into rigid institutional bones. That isn’t to say that INGOs have lost the capacity to change, sometimes in radical ways, and to raise issues that would otherwise go without discussion; but we all have the unsettling feeling that INGOs have not delivered on the promises they made to their publics.

A child of their time, INGOs clearly filled a niche in the international system, particularly as a counter to a post-war foreign policy based on military-industrial interests. Yet INGOs were based on assumptions shared by that same establishment, and took on forms that were familiar with that establishment. The fundamental problem for INGOs – as for governments and corporations – is that the world is changing in ways which are increasingly difficult to manage for these old forms.

The worst case scenario for INGOs is that they find themselves filling in where government has failed, providing alternatives that are not alternatives at all but simply poor substitutes for the old system; or find themselves filling gaps where corporations have proved unable or unwilling to extend their reach, creating pseudo-markets which are largely unsustainable. Where these scenarios come to pass, INGOs will twist themselves into new shapes not in order to challenge the systems which lead to these governance and market failures, but to prop them up instead.

Why is it important for INGOs to survive? The short answer is: it isn’t important. NGOs are simply vehicles for realising a range of social and economic outcomes that cannot be realised through other means. The form of the INGO is not important: it’s the function that’s important, and those functions can potentially be delivered through different forms. A focus on whether the form of the INGO will survive runs the risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater, dismissing the still-important functions in the same breath as the obsolete form.

Mike Edwards writes of INGOs reaching middle age and offers three possible futures: retirement, rejuvenation or replacement. There is a fourth possibility: radical transformation in response to the rapidly changing external environment, transformation which can contain all three of Edwards’ proposed pathways and more besides. Complexity theory gives us some of the tools we need to face that future, but to make use of those tools we need to acknowledge not just that the world has changed, but to reflect that change, rather than attempt to manage it.

We cannot pretend to be agents of change if we are not prepared to change ourselves. The future needs flexibility, not stability; the future lies in collaboration, not competition; the future belongs to the network, not the corporation.

One Assessment to Rule Them All

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The institutional resistance of aid agencies to Open Data isn’t based on their archaic views about the proprietary nature of data. Most of them don’t have archaic views – in fact most of them don’t have views at all, they just copied and pasted from whatever they could find (human rights organisations tend to be better at this, although still nowhere near as good as they should be). The reticence of aid agencies to share their data is based on the fact that their data is crappy, and somewhere deep down, they know it’s crappy.

I’m currently working on a mid-term review for ACAPS, which is turning out to be a glimmer of hope in an otherwise terrifying landscape. Everybody we’ve spoken to so far for the review has said the same thing: ACAPS’ technical work in developing needs assessment methodologies and tools is excellent, and there’s nobody else in sector doing anything like it. Their simple revolution has been to introduce some proper survey expertise into the needs assessment process as part of an end-to-end service. It’s not necessarily innovative in terms of statistical analysis or data management – just good practice.

Thanks to the foresight of its founding members, it was written into ACAPS DNA that it provides support to the Needs Assessment Task Force of the Inter Agency Standing Committee.1 The NATF approach to solving the crappy data problem is to develop a single inter-agency rapid assessment form and process, which will at the very least get us a baseline that everybody can agree upon. The problem with this solution is that it doesn’t solve the wider problem of crappy data (and let’s not even talk about the widerer problem of crappy decision-making that doesn’t even bother with data in the first place), it just covers our backs when the donors ask why we allocated resources the way we did in the first two weeks. What the NATF is developing is a good idea in many ways (although a bad idea in others) but I think they’d be the first to agree that it ain’t no magic bullet for what is an endemic problem.

All this is a long-winded way of saying that while open data is inherently good (both from a technical point of view, but also in the sense of a ‘public good’), it’s not going to be much use if the data that you’re opening is crappy. I might think that crowdsourcing doesn’t deliver much value, but I’m not going to single out the crowdsorcerors for the sake of it – the sad truth is that their data is just as crappy as everybody else’s.2 I should clarify crappy: I mean data that isn’t collected in a systematic way within a sound theoretical framework using tested techniques appropriate for the situation. Crappy data will only generate crappy open data. True fact.

Next post: Disaster 2.0 vs Government 2.0, and why open data matters.

  1. The IASC is the single most important policy body in the humanitarian sector, which is why the UN hasn’t given it a separate website, but shoehorned it into the shockingly poor HIC website. The HICs are no longer functional, the main website isn’t being updated, you can’t even navigate to the IASC website from the HIC site, and if you do manage to find it, it’s like navigating in fog; if you’re interested, this is pretty much a textbook example of how not to build a website. []
  2. Okay, maybe a bit more crappy – although notice how Ushahidi deployments have tended to morph from crowdsourced to directed monitoring or survey – and potentially a bit less crappy if and when those tools are implemented within an effective framework. []

A United Nations for the Real World

Quite apart from the pantheon in clown shoes for whom ending UN funding is always worth a punt, the global financial crisis has shaken the foundations of the money pit upon which the UN was built. (Although to be fair, it wasn’t a particularly big money pit.) One unforeseen effect of the crisis has been the problematic overvaluation of the Swiss Franc as investors tried to move their money someplace safe. In Geneva this week, I heard whispered stories about how UN agencies are planning to move staff out of Geneva because the cost of living is so high, and there’s running commentary on WHO’s adventures in downsizing.

But hey! We work in a sector where every crisis is also an opportunity (poor translation ahoy),  so perhaps this is an opportunity to redesign the UN, to eliminate the problems it suffers from and maybe even make it relevant again. Ask yourself the question, what might the UN look like if you devised it for the world we actually live in? The UN has accreted so many layers that such a restructuring will never happen, since the system will collapse before it reforms in any significant way. If we were playing Fantasy Palais des Nations, however, here’s what I would like the humanitarian elements of the UN to look like:

  1. All operational work should be stripped from the agencies. Generally they’re just not that good at it, and would be more effective if they focused on advisory services, policy development, advocacy campaigns, and possibly capacity building. “No operations” should be built into their mandates in order to prevent the mission creep that has crippled them over the years.
  2. Funding responsibility should also be stripped. As well as costing money on administrative costs and exchange rate losses, it’s an extra layer of bureaucracy that clogs up the works. The only argument that can be made for the UN controlling funding is that this enables better coordination, but the evidence suggests that anybody making this argument is delusional.
  3. Break down each agency into functional units comprised of small clusters of specialist staff. These staff would be distributed around the world through virtual office technology, with only small centralised headquarter offices for basic management of these teams and coordination of activities such as advocacy. Lean and mean is the way to go.
  4. These staff would then deploy only in situations where their specialist expertise is required, preventing the clusterf*ck you get when every section of every agency tries to get its foot in the office door in a big disasters. These staff would work within other organisations – civilian and military, government and non-government, donor and recipient – and be project-focused.
  5. When not deployed, UN staff would act as critical nodes in a global network of humanitarian actors that would all contribute to policy development on a more equal footing. This would create flexible and iterative processes, instead of the sclerotic nonsense that the IASC has to go through every time it wants to issue a proclamation about how many mickle makes a muckle.
  6. Operational work would be done by anybody who was capable, funded through bilateral funding on a country basis, possibly through donor secretariats, especially in conflict areas. Since NGOs and other actors already do most of the heavy lifting, this would be a direct contract scheme, with UN nodes playing an advisory role on grants approval and possibly implementation.
  7. WE NOW RETURN YOU TO YOUR REGULARLY SCHEDULED PROGRAMMING:

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Interesting but Wrong vs Right but Obvious

Interesting but wrong

I realise that lolcatz are yesterday's news.

The second round of Humanitarian Innovation Fund grants have now been decided, and should be posted on the HIF large grants website before too long. Once again, the Grants Panel discussions about innovation were as interesting as the projects themselves – possibly more so this time, because I had a feeling that the level of innovation in the proposals submitted for this round was even weaker than the last round.

That evening I had a chance to catch up with Ben Ramalingam, whose work on complexity and aid is some of the most interesting research being done in the sector at the moment. We had a wide-ranging and fascinating discussion that took in landscape engineering, urban mathematics, humanitarian futurology and the relative merits of the Sandman and Lucifer comic books (I’m down with Lucifer, Ben with Sandman – but he’s going to give Lucifer another chance).

I don’t agree with Ben on everything, but his views are always interesting, and this started me thinking. Where are the interesting thinkers in the humanitarian sector? There’s a lot of thoughtful people working on aid issues (some of whom blog), but being thoughtful isn’t always enough to qualify as an interesting thinker. The blogs I linked to are consistently insightful, but they’re tightly focused on aid, without much effort to introduce tie together new ideas in an innovative way.

While I was in London for the HIF, I also had the chance to drop in on the Truth and Beauty sessions curated by Vinay Gupta. Up front, I disagree with Vinay on a lot of issues – but he has the ability to pull together widely divergent thoughts into something coherent and his views are never less than interesting. Vinay is in a different (if tangentially related) space to the humanitarian sector, and I actually struggle to think of many individuals in the humanitarian sector who have the same capacity.

Since then I’ve chatted with a few friends and colleagues, and asked them the question: who are the interesting thinkers in the humanitarian sector? So far I haven’t been able to build a list, and that worries me. The humanitarian community is struggling at the moment with a range of issues which we’re ill-equipped to deal with, and the default solution to tough challenges is to add more layers to the bureaucracy. There’s a serious lack of vision within the sector, and nobody’s close to addressing that gap.

Like Funding Innovation

Bill and Phil at the wheel

Posting on The Humanitarian Groundhog Day, the always efficacious Ben Ramalingam pointed out the coordination is a wicked problem [pdf] – essentially a planning challenge that can’t be dealt with using linear planning tools.1 Broadly I agree, although I don’t accept that coordination has all the characteristics that are usually identified for wicked problems, but I’m not convinced that’s the primary reason why the humanitarian sector acts like Bill Murray.

Our work for ICVA wasn’t looking at the meta-issue of coordination, but the specifics of how NGO coordination in the field actually works (leaving aside the question of whether it works). However the overview did point out lack of progress in developing a functional definition or tools for coordination that could do any heavy lifting.2 The reason why those things are important (if dull) is the same reason why we keep repeating our mistakes – not just in coordination, but in a number of areas.

Short version: while I agree with Ben that this is a systemic problem, and that a large part of that problem is misaligned incentives, we have to pay attention to a) the people who work in that system and b) their relationship to those incentives. That’s because a) system behaviour emerges from the behaviour of the agents in that system (although it can’t be reduced to that behaviour, because! Complexity!) and b) different individuals respond to the same incentives in different ways. At root, this is a human resources problem, or rather a set of HR problems.

So: staff turnover is high, because of the stress and unpredictability of disaster response work; compounded by rapid growth of the sector (particularly NGOs), because the increase in staff demand has not been matched by a corresponding growth in supply. This has lead to increasing reliance on young and inexperienced staff in increasingly senior positions (in a sector which already relied quite heavily on them). I could go on, but in the words of Paul Simon: “It’s every generation throws a hero up the pop charts”.

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Which is to say that the wheel keeps getting reinvented because the humanitarian community lacks any sense of its own history. That applies even to the old hands3 who are usually so overloaded that they struggle to remember what happened yesterday, let alone what happened ten years ago. It’s too obvious to say that we lack the tools for knowledge management, when the real problem is that we lack historical perspective; on the ground, this leads to a Year Zero approach to issues like coordination.

Interestingly, specific sectors such as health or shelter do make progress in terms of professionalism, although any such progress is hard won. I’d argue that’s because those sectors are populated by sector-specific professionals with links to a professional sector that exists outside the humanitarian sphere, providing a ready-made set of continuity tools and professional resources. Whether we could turn humanitarian coordination (or “humanitarianism”) into a similar sector is an open question.4

Some people might read this as an argument for certification, in the interests of professionalising the sector. It’s actually an argument against certification, but that’s a post that will have to wait for another day when it’s not so sunny outside. For now what we need to remember is this: while Ben’s proposals are a useful part of any solution to this wicked problem, there’s a high chance of failure unless some more elementary problems are addressed at the same time.

When Maps Go Bad

Laugh-Out-Loud Cats #1224

I know how you feel mate, I know how you feel.

Not “Disaster 2.0″, Just “Disaster”

I posted on UN Dispatch today about the risks of failing to learn from what’s gone before. Needless to say, documentation of previous humanitarian information work is thin on the ground, but that’s exactly why we need to create mechanisms for better institutional memory. The idea that Haiti was Year Zero for humanitarian information isn’t always explicit, but the general tone of a lot of online commentary definitely labours under its influence, particularly from those who don’t necessarily understand the work.

Haiti has exposed both the benefits and risks of the web-enabled response to disaster. The positive side has been written about extensively – wider awareness, greater levels of engagement, access to potentially valuable resources (whether satellite imagery or volunteer time). I’ll go on record here as believing that these are all to the good, and possibly the starting point for greater good in the future; although if we’re going to get to that future good, everybody’s going to have to check their egos at the door.

Unfortunately the negative side is almost completely ignored. Wider awareness that isn’t informed by grounded understanding is useless, and occasionally dangerous; greater levels of engagement need to harnessed in the right direction if they’re going to have any impact; and access to resources is unevenly distributed and comes loaded with assumptions that are often hidden from the people who provide those resources. The UN Dispatch blog post series is a good start but it’s no substitute for hard discussion.

Haiti also amplified another trend – the involvement of the public in debates about humanitarian principles and practice. This is something that we should welcome, but I’m a big fan of people knowing the limitations of their own experiences. I don’t feel the need to pontificate on the finer points of hospital management, because I’m not competent to discuss them; yet for some reason people feel that they’re entitled to pass judgement on the humanitarian sector based on what they just read in Wired or Newsweek.

While the recommendations in the Disaster 2.0 itself are likely to have positive impacts, they’re generally about how the humanitarian community can better utilize technology, rather than how “volunteer and technology communities” (and my word, what a frightful phrase that is) can perform better. Likewise this report on Volunteer Technology Communities does nothing more than describe what they do, rather than the impact they can have.

If we put all of this together, we can identify the problem at the heart of this debate; and possibly why some on the “V&TC” side has become increasingly defensive. In all the discussion about how social media might affect the humanitarian community, as far as I know, nobody has yet articulated a clear theory of change. That was what I was hoping for last year, when I challenged the crowdsourcing community to clearly articulate how the inputs they deliver will lead to the outputs they claim will result.

If we’re going to work actively to ensure that our use of technology is going to help anybody in post-disaster/post-conflict responses (whether 2.0 or just plain 1.0), all of us need to be much clearer about exactly how it’s going to help. I emphasise that this is a management problem, not a technology problem; and to their credit the Disaster 2.0 report writers very clearly targeted their recommendations on addressing the management issues, at least in some small part. Let’s see where this takes us.

Like Herding Groundhogs

Groundhog Day screencap

Bill and Phil at the wheel

Posting on The Humanitarian Groundhog Day, the always efficacious Ben Ramalingam pointed out the coordination is a wicked problem [pdf] – essentially a planning challenge that can’t be dealt with using linear planning tools.1 Broadly I agree, although I don’t accept that coordination has all the characteristics that are usually identified for wicked problems, but I’m not convinced that’s the primary reason why the humanitarian sector acts like Bill Murray.

Our work for ICVA wasn’t looking at the meta-issue of coordination, but the specifics of how NGO coordination in the field actually works (leaving aside the question of whether it works). However the overview did point out lack of progress in developing a functional definition or tools for coordination that could do any heavy lifting.2 The reason why those things are important (if dull) is the same reason why we keep repeating our mistakes – not just in coordination, but in a number of areas.

Short version: while I agree with Ben that this is a systemic problem, and that a large part of that problem is misaligned incentives, we have to pay attention to a) the people who work in that system and b) their relationship to those incentives. That’s because a) system behaviour emerges from the behaviour of the agents in that system (although it can’t be reduced to that behaviour, because! Complexity!) and b) different individuals respond to the same incentives in different ways. At root, this is a human resources problem, or rather a set of HR problems.

So: staff turnover is high, because of the stress and unpredictability of disaster response work; compounded by rapid growth of the sector (particularly NGOs), because the increase in staff demand has not been matched by a corresponding growth in supply. This has lead to increasing reliance on young and inexperienced staff in increasingly senior positions (in a sector which already relied quite heavily on them). I could go on, but in the words of Paul Simon: “It’s every generation throws a hero up the pop charts”.

YouTube Preview Image

Which is to say that the wheel keeps getting reinvented because the humanitarian community lacks any sense of its own history. That applies even to the old hands3 who are usually so overloaded that they struggle to remember what happened yesterday, let alone what happened ten years ago. It’s too obvious to say that we lack the tools for knowledge management, when the real problem is that we lack historical perspective; on the ground, this leads to a Year Zero approach to issues like coordination.

Interestingly, specific sectors such as health or shelter do make progress in terms of professionalism, although any such progress is hard won. I’d argue that’s because those sectors are populated by sector-specific professionals with links to a professional sector that exists outside the humanitarian sphere, providing a ready-made set of continuity tools and professional resources. Whether we could turn humanitarian coordination (or “humanitarianism”) into a similar sector is an open question.4

Some people might read this as an argument for certification, in the interests of professionalising the sector. It’s actually an argument against certification, but that’s a post that will have to wait for another day when it’s not so sunny outside. For now what we need to remember is this: while Ben’s proposals are a useful part of any solution to this wicked problem, there’s a high chance of failure unless some more elementary problems are addressed at the same time.

  1. Like say, a logframe. Look, internet: controversy. []
  2. It’s 2011 and AFAIK nobody has bothered to include “taking minutes” in any coordination training. []
  3. I recently realised that I’m an Old Hand rather than a Young Turk, or possibly somewhere in the middle. []
  4. To which the answer is no, if you’re interested. []

The Five Elements of NGO coordination

Hot on the heels of the NGO coordination review, we started talking about developing the How-To manual for NGOs that want to form a coordination body. I firmly believe that there’s a particular approach which has been proven to work (more or less) effectively in the field, and that we should be promoting the hell out of it.

We didn’t include it in the Report because not everybody agreed on the details, but it’s worth putting out there. In the absence of alternatives and in the face of a humanitarian reform process that largely fails to take capacities and concerns of the NGO community into account, these five elements provide a starting point for NGOs to consider how they can best arrange themselves.

  1. A General Meeting that brings together a critical mass from a clearly-defined NGO constituency in a clearly-defined structure for clearly-defined purposes.
  2. An elected Executive or Steering Committee composed of senior NGO staff with sufficient resources to invest time in coordination and to support the Chair.
  3. An elected Chair with the willingness to commit to ensuring the health of the coordination body and the time to deliver on that commitment.
  4. Sub-groups meeting for limited periods on a voluntary and inclusive basis to develop specific outputs that address specific issues of concern to the NGO community (or a subset of it).
  5. A Secretariat function that fulfills (at a minimum) basic administrative functions, to free Committee members to play a representative role.

In addition a Terms of Reference is essential to describe the processes that enable these elements to work together to achieve their objectives, to ensure the clarity and continuity of the body, and to provide a measure of accountability to the wider NGO community and its stakeholders.1

The structure outlined above a) makes members responsible for electing the right person through an election process, b) spreads the burden of leadership across a wider range of actors (as opposed to the UN model, which concentrates it in a single individual), and c) provides a supportive environment in which the “wrong” individual might receive the support of peers to grow into a particular role.

It’s important to develop these elements as early as possible: poor coordination structures established in the early days of an emergency response, however temporary, rapidly become fixed in place. The NGO community needs to take responsibility for this as part of its contribution to overall humanitarian coordination.

Despite evidence from these case studies that this structure facilitates NGO coordination, I’d be cautious in recommending it without reservation since reports of success or failure remain anecdotal. Given a rapidly-changing operating environment, past performance of this type of structure may not be an indication of future success. In future we need better documentation, transparently monitored and independently evaluated before we can answer the critical question of how successful it actually is.

  1. The final element of coordination is individual personalities, but by definition this can’t be planned for. []

The long and short of NGO coordination

Slightly later than planned, we’ve published the review of NGO coordination in the field, commissioned by ICVA to look back over the last decade of NGO coordination efforts. The final report consists of an Overview, a series of Case Studies and a set of Lessons Learned, each of which reads as a standalone document. I’m working on a consolidated report which contains all of them, as soon as I finish reading the OpenOffice user manual, but I want to use this blog post to highlight some of the key points that we found.

First and most important: despite what you may have heard, NGO coordination is extremely common. We found NGO coordination bodies in a range of different contexts, although there were persistent weaknesses common to many of them, the most common of which was that they tend to be reactive. Frankly I think NGO coordination bodies need to push the issues that are important to them more actively, particularly in the face of sluggish humanitarian reform and the militarization of aid.

We also found that NGO coordination bodies deal with similar issues everywhere, which means that there’s huge scope for lessons learned (particularly around practical organisation and policy approaches) to be shared more widely in order to strengthen the entire humanitarian community. One of the biggest problems I see is that NGO coordination is too often focused on International NGOs and not enough on Local NGOs; the most obvious reason for this is that it’s just plain difficult to engage local NGOs.

It also seems that there is a “blueprint” for successful organisation of NGO coordination bodies, which we hope to flesh out more in the next phase of the project (that’s what they call a teaser, but I’ll write something on it soon). However we need to be very aware that “success” in this context is limited in what it can achieve, because NGO coordination by itself won’t resolve critical problems, particularly those involving humanitarian principles.

There’s also a lot of questions outstanding. What do NGOs want to achieve through coordination; for example, given the weaknesses of the cluster system, do we want to get more involved in sectoral coordination? How can we use NGO coordination bodies to promote the changes we want to see in the sector more broadly, e.g. local NGO partnership, humanitarian principles, new challenges? How do international NGO consortia (such as ICVA, or InterAction) want to support these field-based efforts?

So download and read them, send them to your sweetheart for Valentine’s Day, put your money in the tip box, &c &c. The Case Studies cover:

  • Afghanistan 1988-2010
  • Haiti 2010
  • Iraq 2003-2010
  • Kosovo 1999-2002
  • Myanmar 2008-2010
  • Occupied Palestinian Territories 1967-2010
  • Pakistan 2002-2010
  • Sudan 1999-2010
  • South Sudan 1996-2010