Interesting new paper from Ben Ramalingam and Michael Barnett at ODI builds on Ben’s work in systems thinking to propose the Humanitarian’s Dilemma:
that by being morally sound but organisationally focused, and acting rationally in line with the incentives that arise at the point of disasters, aid agencies will continue to deliver against their narrow objectives, and to the detriment of the wider system.
I share many of Ben’s interests in this area but, while the paper makes several interesting points, it fails to present a substantial argument rooted in practice. For a start, the dilemma presented doesn’t appear to be a dilemma at all, at least not in the sense that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma crops up as game theory is introduced, which presents another problem. While game theory has some uses, it is frequently undermined by the assumptions that were built into it, in a similar way in which similar assumptions have undermined neoclassical economics.
These are assumptions about the way in which humans act in the social environment, assumptions that most of us wouldn’t recognise in our daily lives. The Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrates it nicely with its central assumption that there’s “no trust among thieves”, which of course is a false assumption. Psychological egoism is not my preferred operating system.
When it falls, game theory falls because human nature is driven towards cooperation at least as much as it is competition, but with both of those drives are bounded by the social environment in which the actors are embedded. Game theory thinks it acknowledges this, but its reductionist approach doesn’t sit well with the world: actors need to be seen on a crowded stage, not a blank canvas.
The paper does acknowledge this, quoting Elinor Ostrom that ‘social scientists need to recognize that individual behavior is strongly affected by the context in which interactions take place’. Ben and Michael have taken heed of that – I just think they misunderstand the context (and possibly what constitutes a black swan event, but that’s another story).
The authors are right to point out that existing incentives in the aid system lead agencies towards undesirable behaviour. The obstacle to organisational change is that the incentives for individuals differ from the incentives for organisations – one of the key problems the sector faces.
While individuals in aid agencies may be motivated to “do good” and to “do well”, their definitions of those terms and their incentives for doing them will differ from the agencies they work for. As far as I know, nobody has considered how to align the two sets of incentives – if that can even be done.
Individual drives to reform humanitarian organisations run aground on this mismatch of interests, but because the mismatch is not explicitly recognised, we tend to stand around scratching our heads and wondering why – with the best will in the world – yet another accountability initiative failed.
Once the mismatch is made explicit we can ask the real questions: how did our organisations come to be this way? What pressures work on them, and who established the parameters they work within? And how can we re-align the incentives to ensure that these organisations do their jobs?
Despite its flaws, the paper is absolutely right that the places to look if you want real humanitarian reform are the incentives. My main criticism is that Ben and Michael fail to ground discussion of those incentives in the reality on the ground, and so misread them; but this is still essential reading.
Related posts:
Perhaps the humanitarian organisations do so because expertise has a real pay off? Perhaps nobody is really capable to deliver real results against a “system”.
Perhaps the costs of system coordination increase exponentially with the partners, up to the level where coordination becomes counterproductive?
Perhaps humanitarian organisations have a well defined mandate they are supposed to respect, without which they would just work “in the general direction of good and institutional self-strengthening”.
Perhaps if donors would believe strengthening the system is a good thing, they would fund the system instead of individual agencies?
Paul – nice piece. Still amazing that we don’t consider this mismatch of incentives more often.
Nigel