Your analysis that INGOs are responsible for stifling civil society in Sudan but fails to consider any other sources of weak civil society.

Well, yes – certainly there are other factors, but I wasn’t writing about those factors in this particular blog post.

1. Conflict tends to be inimical to civil society development, for a variety of reasons.

Agreed, but there hasn’t been any conflict in Southern Sudan for the last 5 years, which is the context in which we have to analyse civil society development. My point is that civil society development is being warped by the presence of international NGOs over an extended period.

2. The population density is around 15 people/square km… I would imagine that low population density correlates to low civil society strength.

You could argue that in rural communities where the state doesn’t reach, the concept of civil society is meaningless. Interestingly, if you’re right then all the civil society strengthening in the world won’t make any difference as long as the population density remains low.

3…Thus one could argue that South Sudanese civil society is manifesting itself through [the Church] rather than through indigenous NGOs.

I agree, and one of my points is that the (predominantly secular) NGO community consistently fails to recognise and engage with this.

4. Education and literacy rates in the South are dismal… This too complicates civil society organizing.

Civil society development doesn’t depend on education. Education and literacy rates in India aren’t great, but I don’t think that anybody would argue that civil society is weak there. Can I suggest that it’s a very western perspective to assume that participation in civil society requires a minimum level of education?

… it’s hard to conclude that INGOs are the principal obstacle to indigenous civil society in South Sudan.

Not really. My argument is that INGOs are stifling civil society not just because of their activities – which displace potential local actors – but because of the well-funded model that they present. It is this which – in the absence of alternative models – potential catalysts for civil society in Southern Sudan will copy, thus replicating the failing INGO model.

Your analysis that INGOs are responsible for stifling civil society in Sudan but fails to consider any other sources of weak civil society. Let me propose a few alternative thoughts on why civil society is weak in South Sudan – irrespective of the role of INGOs:

1. Perpetual conflict – The South has experienced conflict almost continually since Sudanese independence, with a break of about a decade from 1972-83. Conflict tends to be inimical to civil society development, for a variety of reasons. It inclines social investment in military structures rather than social structures, meaning that more social resources (people, money, effort) flow to the military and less to civil society – the South Sudanese put a lot more social capital into the SPLA than into civil society. Conflict also spurs displacement, breaking up communities and destroying the social fabric that would otherwise underpin civil society strength. Lastly, the Khartoum government has traditionally sought to actively undermine civil society strength in it periphery, creating yet another obstacle to the development of civil society capacity in recent decades.

2. Geography – Southern Sudan is HUGE, with a relatively small population of 9-10 million people (depending on whether you believe the recent census!). The population density is around 15 people/square km. This is much lower than neighboring Kenya (67) or Uganda (137), indicating a much more sparsely populated territory. I don’t know if there is academic research on this, but I would imagine that low population density correlates to low civil society strength. Civil society strength depends on density of social connections – between influential individuals, groups, etc. This is difficult within very geographically dispersed population; even more so when that population has poor transport and communications infrastructure.

3. The Church – In analyzing South Sudanese civil society, it is important not to overlook the role of the church in South Sudan. Religious leaders hold significant influence; the church provides a range of social services; and the church is one of few territory-wide institutions in the South. Thus one could argue that South Sudanese civil society is manifesting itself through this channel rather than through indigenous NGOs.

4. Education – Education and literacy rates in the South are dismal. Around 24% of the population is literate; rates for women are considerably lower. This too complicates civil society organizing.

One could make a plausible case that, given these existing structural constraints, INGOs have made a bad situations worse. But it’s hard to conclude that INGOs are the principal obstacle to indigenous civil society in South Sudan…..

Just as a bunch of neighbors working for safer, cleaner neighborhoods in Arkansas might not show up at environmental convention in Washington DC–because of lack of funds, because they have other full time jobs–much of Sudanese civil society is not represented at the NGO forum in Juba.

No question that community organizations have far far fewer resources than their counterparts in richer countries and it is exponentially more difficult to form broader regional/national coalitions.

International, national NGOs and government can do a better job of engaging and encouraging these groups as partners in our work. Often they ARE involved as advisors, participants, beneficiaries. However, their driving influence can be partially or fully obscured by the time the project is distilled into a report because they don’t fit into the dominant development/aid paradigm of aid worker-beneficiary-refugee-IDP-vulnerable women, etc. We see what the donors want to see, which is fundamentally messed up. From both the government’s and donor’s side there should be more flexibility to recognize these groups as key catalysts of positive change.

The reason most international NGOs are here is to provide services that require a huge amount of logistics, coordination and accounting, which even the government has been unable to provide thus far. They also in theory have systems in place to be more accountable with funds (read: trusted by donors). In the medium term, it would be great if national NGOs could be ‘strong enough’ (read: trusted by donors) to take over a part of service provision. This could save time and money and probably improve local responsiveness. In fact, the national NGO sector attracts those who will be running the government themselves if and when the government is more functional, paid better and less corrupt. NGOs that think NGOs will be running services in Southern Sudan until the end of time are either anarchists or just living in the moment.

At the local level, and as conditions stabilize, other forms of civil society should continue to evolve and be active. Before their bus drives away, international NGOs should look for more ways to listen to and partner with these groups.

Part of the point of the post was to draw attention to the lack of distinction drawn between NGOs and civil society in Southern Sudan (and not just in Southern Sudan) – the lack of capacity of local NGOs was merely the springboard from which my thoughts sprang. That’s why Point 1 specifically says that one pernicious effect of international NGOs is to present “the NGO” as the vehicle through which “civil society” acts, masking the massive range of activities that you find in countries with a healthy civil society.

The line of thought was set by the Indigenous NGO Forum in Southern Sudan being desperate to register themselves as an NGO. The reasons they gave was that this is the only way to be recognised by the government and to get funding from the donors. That’s not quite true, of course, but it’s quite close to the truth – and that bothered me enough to write this post.